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Could Transnistria block Moldova’s integration with the EU?
Wojciech Konończuk, Witold Rodkiewicz
Moldova’s progress in its negotiations on an Association Agreement with the European Union, 
with a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) as its key element, has become 
a source of tension between Chisinau and the breakaway Republic of Transnistria. An almost 
certain refusal by Transnistria to join the DCFTA, will deprive the region of the benefits it cur-
rently enjoys under the EU Autonomous Trade Preferences (ATP) worsening its already preca-
rious economic situation. It is to be expected that the issue will become an additional source 
of tension between the two sides of the Transnistrian conflict, and might also have a negative 
impact on the EU–Russia relationship. 
The signing of the Association Agreement, which is scheduled for the autumn of 2013, will 
be an important step towards Moldova’s integration with the EU. Both sides assign great im-
portance to the speediest possible finalisation of the Agreement, and so far the  negotiations 
have been described as progressing very smoothly. Transnistria’s highly sceptical attitude to-
wards its possible accession to the DCFTA, however, is consistent with the interests of its main 
ally, Moscow. It is highly probable that Russia intends to thwart Moldova’s EU association 
process. Moscow’s objective seems to be to draw Moldova permanently into its own sphere of 
influence, and therefore it perceives Chisinau’s movement towards the EU as a transgression 
against its geopolitical interests. Consequently, in order to hinder this process, Russia may 
instrumentally exploit its extensive influence over Transnistria to provoke a crisis between 
Tiraspol and Chisinau. An apparent increase in Russian presence in the region over the last 
few months (including tighter control over Transnistria’s KGB and the Ministry of Information) 
may suggest that the Kremlin is preparing to implement such a scenario. 
The current state of the EU–Moldova 
DCFTA negotiations 
The DCFTA negotiations between Moldova and 
the European Union were launched in March 
2012, and three rounds of talks have already 
been held. The constructive attitude demon-
strated by Moldova has allowed the negotiat-
ing teams to quickly settle a number of diffi-
cult issues (trade in goods, customs and trade 
facilitation, public procurement and energy), 
which indicates that Moldova wishes to com-
plete the negotiations and sign the Association 
Agreement in the autumn of 2013. Declara-
tions coming from Brussels also suggest that 
this is a realistic time frame. Although the final 
Association Agreement will require ratifica-
tion by all EU member states (which could take 
up to two years), an interim implementation 
clause is likely to be adopted for the DCFTA. 
The implementation of the DCFTA will bring 
about a deepening of economic integration 
of Moldova with the EU, and the adoption by 
Moldova of part of the EU acquis, which is seen 
as a crucial instrument in the modernisation 
of the country. 
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DCFTA and Transnistria
Currently, there are no reasons to believe 
that Transnistria might change its position 
and join the ongoing DCFTA negotiations. 
This in turn means that the region will not 
be covered by the agreement. Despite en-
couragement from Brussels and Chisinau, 
Tiraspol has so far refused to participate active-
ly in the talks and has merely delegated to it 
a low-ranking observer. This means that Trans-
nistria is de facto not taking part in negotiating 
matters that are of direct interest to Transnis-
trian exporters (export quotas, customs tariffs, 
transition periods, etc). Transnistrian govern-
ment officials and local experts have argued 
that accession to the DCFTA would actually be 
economically harmful to the region, and that 
implementing the EU acquis would run against 
the grain of Tiraspol’s policy of legal harmoni-
sation with the Russian Federation. One gets 
the impression that Transnistria refuses to par-
ticipate in DCFTA negotiations in order to argue 
later that the new trade regime has been intro-
duced unilaterally, without consultation with 
Tiraspol, and without taking its interests into 
account. Transnistria might even hope that 
as a result of its refusal to join the DCFTA, 
the EU will suspend the signing of the DCFTA 
agreement with Moldova. 
Currently, Transnistrian companies are able to 
export goods to the EU market under the Auton-
omous Trade Preferences granted to Moldova 
by Brussels in 2007. As a result, the EU market 
absorbs as much as 30–50% of Transnistria’s 
total exports1. However, if Chisinau signs 
the DCFTA agreement, the ATP regime will 
be automatically discontinued. Its further 
application for Transnistria alone will not be 
possible for legal reasons; since the Transnistri-
an government lacks international recognition, 
it cannot be a party to any legally-binding agree-
ment with the European Union. Consequently, 
once the DCFTA has been implemented, 
EU customs tariffs on Transnistrian exports 
will rise by 10–17%, which will have a serious 
impact on the region’s economy. 
Russia’s position on a DCFTA for Moldova
The signing and implementation of the DCFTA 
agreement will result in a high degree of eco-
nomic and legal integration between Moldova 
and the EU (through the implementation of 
large parts of the EU acquis), which in turn will 
make it impossible for Moldova to participate in 
regional integration projects in the post-Soviet 
area (i.e. the Customs Union and the planned 
Eurasian Union), and thus frustrating the im-
plementation of Moscow’s openly declared 
strategic policy goal in Moldova2. The Russian 
political elite remains convinced that Moldova 
naturally belongs in the Eurasian integration 
projects. Importantly, fostering such projects is 
one of the main objectives of President Vladimir 
Putin’s foreign policy. Most likely, from the 
Kremlin’s perspective, it is not only the fate of 
Moldova which is involved, but also prevent-
ing the precedent of a successful integration 
of a CIS state with the EU (even if temporarily 
integration will remain incomplete, i.e. falling 
short of EU membership). Russia is particularly 
1 According to Transnistria’s official figures, 30% of the 
region’s exports reach the EU market; Moldovan and 
EU experts, however, have placed this figure at around 
50%. Another 35% of Transnistrian exports are bought 
by Moldova. 
2 For a detailed discussion of Russia’s foreign policy on Mol-
dova, see Witold Rodkiewicz, ‘Russia’s strategy towards 
Moldova: continuation or change?’, OSW Commentary, 
18 April 2012, http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/
files/commentary_74.pdf
Currently, there are no signs suggesting 
that Transnistria could join the DCFTA ne-
gotiations, and that it will therefore even-
tually be covered by the agreement.
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concerned about the effect such a precedent 
might have on Ukraine’s future political course. 
Therefore one should assume that Moscow 
may use Transnistria as an instrument for 
preventing closer ties between Moldova 
and the EU, and to provoke a political cri-
sis between Chisinau and Tiraspol, using as 
a pretext Tiraspol’s loss of trade preferences 
following Moldova’s accession to the DCFTA. 
An attempt to provoke such a crisis is all the 
more likely due to the perception, widely 
shared in Russia, that the current geopolitical 
situation and reality and the existing balance of 
power with the West, is favourable to Moscow, 
due to the deepening crisis within the Europe-
an Union and the serious economic plight of 
other post-Soviet states. Therefore in Moscow’s 
view this might look like a propitious moment 
for undertaking actions that would permanent-
ly block integration between former Soviet re-
publics and the European Union. 
In the context of the scenario sketched out above, 
Russia’s tightening of control over the Trans-
nistrian security forces (for instance, the new 
deputy head of Tiraspol’s KGB previously served 
as Dagestan’s deputy director of the Federal Se-
curity Service) and the Ministry of Information 
(which controls the local media) seems particu-
larly significant. Over the last few months, visits 
to Transnistria by high-ranking Russian officials 
have become increasingly frequent; among the 
recent visitors were Dmitry Rogozin, the depu-
ty prime minister and the Russian president’s 
special envoy to Transnistria (who is also re-
sponsible for the Russian defence industry) and 
Anatoly Serdyukov, Russia’s defence minister 
(a historical first). All these measures collective-
ly can be seen as a preparation for a crisis in 
the region, the aim of which would be to block 
further integration between Moldova and the 
EU, and to send a signal to the West that Mos-
cow will not suffer Brussels to unilaterally de-
cide the future of countries from the so-called 
‘shared neighbourhood’. Particularly strik-
ing in this context was a statement by Sergei 
Gubarev, Russian Foreign Ministry’s special en-
voy, who suggested during his visit to Tiraspol 
in mid-October that Transnistria could be al-
lowed into the Customs Union, and that Rus-
sia might recognise the region’s independence 
should Moldova lose its sovereignty or neutrality. 
EU proposals for Transnistria’s member-
ship of the DCFTA 
Both official and unofficial statements by EU 
officials indicate that the European Union as-
sumes that the issue could be resolved by 
convincing Transnistrian businesses of the 
benefits of joining the DCFTA, and thus re-
taining their present access to the EU mar-
ket. Brussels hopes that Transnistrian compa-
nies will be able to put sufficient pressure on 
Yevgeny Shevchuk to persuade him to join the 
on-going DCFTA negotiations. In addition, 
Brussels also seems to believe that the DCFTA 
offers such economic opportunities that it can 
serve as an instrument for persuading the po-
litical and economic elites in Tiraspol to show 
more flexibility and to arrive at a modus vivendi 
with Chisinau within a framework of a single 
Moldovan state. Therefore EU officials are ap-
proaching the DCFTA as a tool for facilitating 
the reunification of Moldova – both directly in 
economic terms and indirectly in political terms. 
However, Brussels’ approach is based on 
wishful thinking and a faulty diagnosis of 
the current situation in the region. Transnis-
tria depends heavily on Russian subsidies (both 
direct ones, such as financial transfers, and in-
direct ones, such as a free supply of natural gas 
from Russia), and in order not to lose this sup-
Russia may use Transnistria to block 
the integration process between Moldova 
and the EU, provoking a crisis in relations 
between Chisinau and Tiraspol. 
OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 95 4
port, Shevchuk must strive to retain Moscow’s 
favour. In addition, the Transnistrian leader re-
mains in conflict with the political milieu of the 
former president Igor Smirnov and is fighting for 
extra powers with the Transnistrian parliament, 
which is controlled by the opposition Obnovleni-
ye party. Moreover, he remains at loggerheads 
with Transnistria’s largest company, Sheriff. 
In these conditions, Shevchuk cannot afford to 
ignore the Kremlin’s wishes. During his visit to 
Moscow in February of this year, Shevchuk de-
clared that Transnistria was eager to participate 
in integration projects within the framework of 
the Customs Union; while in early June, he de-
clared that Eurasian integration should be taken 
as the cornerstone of Transnistria’s national idea, 
and issued directives for the official foreign poli-
cy conception to be re-drawn accordingly. 
Possible scenarios 
It appears that the European Union does 
not have a contingency plan for a scenario 
in which Transnistria decides not to join the 
DCFTA. The EU also seems to be playing down 
the possibility that its actions (the offer and the 
signing of the DCFTA) could result in a serious 
crisis both in the region and in its relations with 
Moscow. Neither Brussels nor the governments 
of the individual EU member states are pre-
pared (politically or conceptually) to say wheth-
er the EU is willing to allow for a crisis in its rela-
tions with Russia for the sake of pressing ahead 
with the implementation of its policy towards 
former Soviet republics. 
Assuming the most likely scenario, that Tiraspol 
will continue to reject the EU’s invitation to join 
the DCFTA, Brussels will be left with the follow-
ing three options: 
•	Chisinau agrees to a customs border 
between Moldova and Transnistria
It appears that Chisinau could potentially agree 
to such a solution, even at the expense of deep-
ening the current division of the country and 
further delaying the prospect of reunification. 
However, this option carries the greatest risk of 
serious conflict because it would require the di-
vision of the so-called Security Zone, inhabited 
by around 700,000 people, which until now has 
been controlled by trilateral peacekeeping force 
(Russia–Transnistria–Moldova). Attempts to set 
up Moldovan state customs checkpoints with-
in this zone could be thwarted by Transnistrian 
armed formations and even lead to armed clash-
es. On the other hand, if Chisinau decided to lo-
cate the checkpoints outside the Security Zone, 
this would translate into its de facto surrender 
of a significant part of its territory. Consequent-
ly, Chisinau’s attempts to create a customs bor-
der could be used by Transnistria, and its ally 
Russia, as an excuse to provoke incidents. It is 
unlikely that this could turn into a full-blown 
military conflict, but it could definitely lead to 
armed incidents, which would consequently 
make it impossible to create a customs border, 
and by extension, might prevent Moldova from 
entering the DCFTA. Such incidents could be ac-
companied by Russian economic pressure in the 
form of a selective ban on the import of Moldo-
van goods to Russia, and/or interruptions in the 
supply of Russian gas to Moldova)3. 
3 Signs of Moscow’s pressure on Moldova have become 
evident over the last several months; examples include 
Russia’s insistence that a new contract on gas supply to 
Moldova could be signed only if Chisinau abandoned 
its plans to implement the EU’s Third Energy Package. 
See Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga, ‘Russia’s energy ulti-
matum to Moldova’, EASTWEEK, 19 September 2012, 
h t t p : / / w w w.o s w.w a w. p l / e n / p u b l i k a c j e / e a s t -
week/2012-09-19/russia-s-energy-ultimatum-to-moldova
The EU believes that the issue can be re-
solved by convincing Transnistrian busi-
nesses of the benefits of DCFTA mem-
bership, including continued access to 
the EU market. 
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Nonetheless, even if a customs border with 
Transnistria were successfully established, the 
significant limitations on Transnistrian exports 
to the EU following Moldova’s adoption of the 
the DCFTA would almost certainly create a sit-
uation similar to that witnessed in 2006. Then, 
after Ukraine had discontinued the practice of 
allowing Transnistrian goods through its bor-
der without Moldovan customs seals, Tiraspol 
declared that it was subject to an economic 
blockade, rather than allowing its firms to reg-
ister in Chisinau and thus to enable them to 
continue their export operations (even though 
such an option was offered by Chisinau with-
out subjecting the firms to double taxation). 
At the time Tiraspol preferred to provoke a cri-
sis in its relations with Moldova to a ‘pragmatic’ 
solution. and it is unlikely that its reaction to 
a new change in its export operation regime 
will be different.  
•	The EU suspends the signing of the DCFTA 
agreement with Chisinau
This option, in turn, would deliver a crippling 
blow to the EU policy on Moldova, which dur-
ing the last two years have been widely re-
garded as a success. Brussels, and a number 
of individual EU member states (particularly 
Germany), have invested, both politically and 
financially, in the process of drawing Moldova 
closer to the European Union.  The idea was 
to make Moldova into a positive example for 
the EU’s relations with other countries in the 
so-called ‘shared neighbourhood’. A decision 
to suspend the signing of the agreement could 
also be perceived as a sign of weakness in the 
EU’s relations with Russia. Such a move could 
give the impression that when faced with the 
prospect of a diplomatic crisis, Brussels is pre-
pared to abandon its strategic goals in East-
ern Europe, and (despite its rhetoric) to accept 
that the countries in the region may not freely 
choose between different regional economic 
integration projects. 
•	The EU agrees to grant Transnistria all 
the privileges afforded by the DCFTA 
This solution is problematic for at least two rea-
sons. First, under the DCFTA both sides should 
ultimately lift all mutual customs tariffs. A de-
cision to unilaterally cover Transnistria by the 
DCFTA rules would in effect reward Tiraspol’s 
obstructive attitude, since the region would 
benefit from all the resultant privileges (includ-
ing duty-free access to the EU market) but with-
out having to incur any costs or making any 
commitments. For example, Transnistria would 
still be able to charge duty on goods imported 
from both the EU and Moldova.
Second, by including Transnistria in the free trade 
area, the EU would knowingly create a ‘hole’ in 
its customs border by opening up the possibility 
that goods produced outside the DCFTA could 
freely enter the EU market. This is because Chis-
inau would not be able to inspect Transnistrian 
manufacturers in order to enforce the so-called 
Rules of Origin, which are designed to prevent 
the re-export of goods produced outside the 
DCFTA area into the EU. Consequently, the EU 
cannot extend DCFTA privileges to Transnistria, 
because it would not be able to ensure that Mol-
dovan goods produced in Transnistria had not in 
fact been produced in China or Russia, for exam-
ple, and only repackaged in Transnistria.
